Abstract: This paper sets out a theoretical approach to the nature of interpretation that is intended to overcome some of the challenges of treaty interpretation in international law. By adhering to the approaches of Gadamer and Wittgenstein, it is argued that interpretation is a reciprocal dialogue between the reader and text with the mediation of the 'tradition' and 'language-games'. Although it seems there exists no agreement among legal theorists on the nature of interpretation, reviewing their approaches reveals that they have acknowledged the dependency of meaning upon the traditions and practices of communities. This finding paves the way for providing a new reading for the system of interpretation provided by articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). It is argued that although the VCLT integrates some of the elements of current interpretive methods, ultimately the VCLT adopts its own unique approach. The nature of international law requires taking into account the 'conventionalist theory' to determine meaning based on the acts of the law's subjects. Nevertheless, the nature of interpretation requires that the terms be understood with the mediation of the 'language-games' which is realised by the inclusion of 'the relevant rules of international law'.
In international law, the articulation of the rules of interpretation in the VCLT has not reduced the complexity of legal interpretation. Rather, it has mainly shifted the focus of scholars from the 'nature' of interpretation, which requires theoretical treatment, to the 'how' of the interpretation. However, this scholarly shift in focus largely neglects the fact that, in the absence of a theoretical approach to interpretation in international law, articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT are downgraded to describing some techniques of interpretation which at best can serve as rhetorical tools. A brief review of the adjudication practices under the VCLT reveals just how far the practice of interpretation stands from the underlying objectives of the VCLT's rules of interpretation: certainty and non-arbitrariness. 5 This paper seeks to provide a theoretical approach to the nature of interpretation by resorting to philosophical and linguistic insights on interpretation and meaning, with the aim of overcoming some of the challenges of treaty interpretation in international law. However, this paper is by no means a comprehensive treatment of interpretation; it is only the first step in determining the foundational elements thereof. Therefore, issues such as practical methods of interpretation, inter-temporal law, and evolutive interpretation fall outside the direct scope of this paper.
Section B takes the theories of Gadamer and Wittgenstein as starting points for
shedding light on the nature of interpretation. This section starts with a brief review of the evolution of the concept of interpretation, from its beginnings in techniques used to extract meaning from texts, to a philosophical subject that, by questioning the existence of objective knowledge, focuses on the interplays between the text, the author, and the reader. Based on the philosophical approaches of Gadamer and Wittgenstein, this section suggests that interpretation cannot be reduced to bare text or to the original intentions of authors. Rather, interpretation is a reciprocal dialogue between the reader and text, mediated by the traditions and practices of particular communities.
Section C studies the approaches of legal theorists to interpretation, with the aim of showing that such a philosophical linguistic insight can be tracked in their theories. The change in the philosophical paradigm of knowledge and being bears on legal theories and the 5 The main objective of codification of these rules, as articulated by Roberto Ago, the chairman of the International Law Commission in 1946, was to ensure the certainty of law, which depended mainly on the certainty of the rules of interpretation. ILC, 'Summary record of the 726th meeting' UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.726, para 34. Likewise, Sir Humphrey Waldock, the last Special Rapporteur of the Commission, dismissed the doctrinal resistance toward codification of any rule on interpretation, by declaring that the interpretation of treaties without arbitrariness; and in accordance with the principles of law is the necessary implication of the pacta sunt servanda principle. ILC, 'Third Report on the law of treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur' (Waldock Third Report) UN Doc A/CN.4/167 and Add.1-3, 54 para 8. conception of law in general. As a result, either the traditional theories have evolved in a way to encompass such insights, or new theories and approaches have emerged. The inclusion of the 'internal point of view' as an integral element of the concept of law in the theories of major legal positivists such as HLA Hart, Joseph Raz and Hans Kelsen, is an acknowledgment of the claim by hermeneutic theorists that 'it is inherently paradoxical to study human beings, who have a particular subjective point of view, from a detached and external perspective'. 6 For example, in determining what is the norm, Kelsen maintains that in order for the act of will to have objective meaning, the 'ought' should be considered as an 'ought', 'not only from the point of view of the individual who has performed the act, but from the point of view of the individual at whose behavior the act is directed, and of a third individual not involved in the relation between the two'. 7 Subsequently, legal interpretation, as an important subject within the conceptualisation of law, was transformed from a mere technical tool into a concept that could itself serve as the basis for a legal theory. There are still, however, international law scholars who follow the Classics and advocate using certain techniques of interpretation without seeing any need to lay down any foundation for the concept of interpretation. Although their works are very influential and important, they fall outside the scope of this paper. 8 This is also true of the work of Emer de Vattel and Hugo Grotius, as they clearly belong to the traditional way of thinking about interpretation.
This study will be done by using the methodology offered for studying 'contested concepts', as there seems to be no agreement among scholars on the nature of interpretation.
9
Understanding 'interpretation' as a contested concept suggests a theoretical research method that goes beyond appeal to empirical evidences, linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone, because each definition of the contested concept is based upon divergent patterns of thought.
Therefore, different theoretical opinions on the subject will be examined with the aim to 6 Hans For some scholars, interpretation has a broad sense and includes any kind of 'explanation', or 'understanding'. Other scholars, however, believe that there is a way of understanding a text, which is not interpretation. Some believe that interpretation ends at the point at which language ends, and thus giving a meaning to a text beyond its semantics is not an act of interpretation. Others think that interpretation starts when semantics end. Some advocate the view that interpretation is an effort to determine the meaning according to the intention of authors of the text. Others adhere to the view that meaning can only be found in the usage, the custom, or the interpretive community.
demonstrate the relations between the rival uses of such a concept in different legal thoughts, since these disagreements are not 'haphazard or random, but will tend to be mutually supportive or interlocking'.
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Section D provides a new reading of articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT based upon the conception of interpretation as the reciprocal interaction between the text and the reader, with the mediation of tradition and practice. It will be argued that while the system of interpretation provided by VCLT recognises the value of the text, intention, and purpose of law in the process of interpretation, the VCLT provides its own approach to interpretation.
B. PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION
In its early days, interpretation was conceived of only as a collection of specialised techniques for revealing the original meaning of literary and religious texts. Schleiermacher's theory of interpretation, which can be summarised in his famous formula 'to understand a writer better than he understood himself', was meant to achieve understanding by the 'reconstruction of the production' which 'inevitably renders many things conscious of which the writer may be unconscious'.
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The interplay between a text, its meaning, and the reader reaches its momentum by the ontological-linguistic turn taken by Martin Heidegger, and Gadamer who asserts that 'being that can be understood is language'. 20 Language as the medium in which understanding and agreement concerning an object occur, however, is not the focus of hermeneutics. The focus, according to Gadamer, is on the reciprocal relationship between the text and the reader.
21
Gadamer rejects dividing the hermeneutic problem between the subjectivity of the interpreter and the objectivity of the meaning. Rather, he asserts that interpreters will approach a text with certain 'pre-understandings' about the text, which Gadamer calls 'prejudices'. Prejudicewhich does not necessarily mean false judgment -is a condition for all understanding.
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Gadamer defines 'prejudice' as a 'judgment that is rendered before all the elements that determine a situation have been finally examined'. 23 These judgments are conditioned by history and tradition, thus it is the tradition that 'determines in advance both what seems to us worth inquiring about and what will appear as an object of investigation'. 24 Admitting that such prejudices give a specific 'horizon', a 'range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point', 25 Gadamer calls for the 'historically effected consciousness' to be aware that interpretation requires the 'fusion of horizons' between the text and the reader, 17 Gadamer The philosophical-linguistic approaches discussed above suggest that we do not discover meaning by limiting our vision to bare text, or to the original intentions of authors.
Rather, the tradition and practices within a specific community determine the meanings of terms used in that community. It may be argued, however, that such a philosophical-linguistic insight on the dependency of meaning upon social practices and tradition cannot be applied to law, which is aimed at providing its subject with certainty and stability. For this reason, we must also consider the approaches of different legal theorists to the nature of interpretation.
C. APPROACHES OF LEGAL THEORISTS TO THE NATURE OF INTERPRETATION
Rejecting the intentionalist theory of meaning, Kelsen warns against believing the fiction that a legal norm admits of only one meaning as the 'correct' interpretation, because such a view falsely presents a purely political value judgment as scientific truth. from a higher to a lower level'. 37 In other words, interpretation is linked with the hierarchical structure of legal orders. 38 The result of a legal interpretation, according to Kelsen, can only be the ascertainment of the frame which the law that is to be interpreted represents, and consequently, the cognition of several possibilities within the frame. of all who will be affected by the judge's decision, and a concern to deploy some acceptable general principle as a reasoned basis for decision.
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Despite the distinction Hart makes between the 'core' meaning and the 'penumbra', he does not assume the existence of a transcendental or inherent meaning even in plain cases, as 37 Furthermore, the socially conditioned person, ie, everyone, cannot think beyond the limits made possible by his or her culture. As a result, meaning is not found in text but in the reader, or rather the interpretive community: 'the reader's activities are at the center of attention, where they are regarded not as leading to meaning but as having meaning'. 84 As meaning is derived from the community, Fish believes that there is no correct interpretation that will always hold true. Therefore, 'to consult dictionaries, grammars, and histories is to assume that meanings can be specified independently of the activity of reading'. 85 Fish agrees in general with Dworkin's theory that interpretation is neither purely subjective nor objective, however, he blames Dworkin for 'repeatedly fall[ing] away from his own best insight into a version of the fallacies (of pure objectivity and pure subjectivity)…'. 86 Fish believes that all of the individuals contributing to Dworkin's metaphorical 'chain novel' are as much free as they are constrained, and there is no difference between the first novelists and the others: they are all constrained as they can only create and continue the novel within the constraints of 'novel practice'; but they are free as 'every decision a later novelist makes will rest on his assessment of the situation as it has developed'. 87 As a result, unlike Dworkin, who believes that the judge 'must interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of his own', Of course, asserting the existence of such common elements in the nature of interpretation is by no means equivalent to denying the differences and subtleties of each school of thought discussed above. For example, while Dworkin argues that interpretation is essential to determining what the law is, he also holds that the perfect judge -the metaphorical Judge
Hercules, who is invested with a super-human intellect -will always arrive at one right answer. 99 In contrast, legal hermeneutics views interpretation as the activity of Judge Hermes, who acts within a network 'that can be seen as an infinite volume of instantly available information from which the judge must draw' his conclusion 'in the dialectic play of these possibilities'. 100 These differences, nonetheless, do not impede us from concluding that, given legal theorists' recognition of the dependency of meaning upon social practices and tradition, legal interpretation, by its nature, is not an exception, and therefore, it is always mediated by the 'tradition' and 'language-games' that exists in a specific community.
D. NEW READING OF ARTICLES 31 AND 32 OF THE VCLT
This section applies the framework developed in the above theoretical discussion to the rules of interpretation in international law. In particular, this section asks whether the understanding of the nature of interpretation developed here is consistent with the system provided by the VCLT. Mindful of the controversies which exist concerning the interpretation of international law, the International Law Commission (the 'Commission') opted to codify relatively few rules as 'the strictly legal basis for interpretation'. 101 These articles are based on the view that the text must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the parties' intentions, and that the 97 Gadamer, Weinsheimer and Marshall (n 11) 308. There is no doubt about the importance of text in the process of interpretation.
Interpretation cannot be performed in violation of the facts of a text, but would be an effort to establish those facts. 105 Gadamer describes this as the ability to open ourselves to the superior claim that a text makes, and to respond to what it has to tell us; to be at its 'service', to subordinate ourselves to the text's claim to dominate our minds, since 'interpretation of law… is clearly not a form of domination but of service'. 106 Nevertheless, to assume that words have a 'plain' meaning independent from the tradition within which the word is used permits interpreters to interpret legal texts according to whatever seems suitable to them. This is because the meanings of words cannot be derived from their physical properties or reduced to the real-world objects to which they refer. Thus, the danger of the textual approach is that it opens the door to arbitrary interpretations. Because of this ambiguity, the textual approach may create greater uncertainty than an approach which insists upon a comprehensive, contextual examination of all factors potentially relevant to common intent. 107 Likewise, there was no doubt among the members of the Commission that the text alone is not an adequate source for interpretation, that 'no term had an inherent meaning, the meaning always depended on usage', 108 and that 'a term in isolation had no meaning'. 109 This belief was so strong that the term 'natural' for meaning was deleted immediately from the draft articles 110 as, in the words of Ago, 'the meaning of a term [is] a convention created by the human mind'.
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This position was reemphasised by Waldock in his answers to the comments raised by some states about the danger of textualism, saying that 'with regard to the expression "ordinary meaning", nothing could have been further from the Commission's intention than to suggest that words had a "dictionary" or "intrinsic meaning in themselves."'
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For precisely these reasons, some members of the Commission doubted the usefulness of adding paragraph 4 of article 31, 'special meaning', to the rules of interpretation, and argued that it could safely be omitted because the so-called 'special' meaning would be the natural meaning in the particular context. 113 The reason for retaining this paragraph was not because the Commission denied the fact that the technical or special meaning of a term is derived from its context. Rather, the Commission believed that 'there was a certain utility in laying down a specific rule on the point, if only to emphasize that the burden of proof lies on the party invoking the special meaning of the term'. 114 For this purpose, reference was made to the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case, in which the Permanent Court of International Justice held:
'The geographical meaning of the word "Greenland", ie the name which is habitually used in the maps to denominate the whole island, must be regarded as the ordinary meaning of the word. If it is alleged by one of the Parties that some unusual or exceptional meaning is to be attributed to it, it lies on that Party to establish its contention'. 'we regain the concepts of a historical past in such a way that they also include our own comprehension of them'. 117 In other words, we can never access the intention of the parties objectively; rather, it is always mediated by our 'prejudices'.
In the face of the inadequacy of the text alone to serve as the basis of interpretation, on the one hand, and rejecting the intentions of the parties as the foundational bases of meaning, on the other hand, some scholars advocate for the idea that meaning should be ascertained according to the objective that the text is meant to serve. Fitzmaurice describes this teleological approach as another formulation of the rule ut res magis valeat quam pereat, or the principle of maximum effectiveness. 118 In short, the text should be interpreted to have the fullest value and effect consistent with its wording and with the other parts of the text.
The first draft articles on interpretation proposed by Waldock contained a separate article on effective interpretation 119 for two reasons: its significance as the basis upon which it is justifiable to imply terms in a treaty for the purpose of giving efficacy to the intention of parties expressed in provisions of the treaty; and that in the sphere of implied terms, it sets the proper limits of the application of the principle, so that purely teleological interpretations are ruled out. 120 However, this proposal faced strong objections from the members of the Commission, who thought that insofar as this principle stated a logical rule, it was in any case implicit in the requirement of good faith and the reference to the object and purpose of the restrictive or to an extensive interpretation'. 122 Therefore, the specific rule on effective interpretation was deleted from the draft articles.
Equating the teleological approach to the principle of effectiveness downgrades the process of interpretation to mere techniques, and thus renders the teleological approach insufficient in explaining the nature of interpretation. Even assuming a larger role for this approach does not make it a proper basis for explaining the nature of interpretation, since this approach either defines the object and purpose as what appears in the text, especially in the preamble, which then makes it a variant of the textual approach; or it seeks to define the object and purpose by going beyond the text and searching for the intentions of the parties, which makes it a variant of the subjective approach. 123 At best, this approach can only tell us how interpretation should be done.
Nevertheless, it is still believed that the interpretive system provided by the VCLT does not take a strong position with respect to the doctrinal debates on treaty interpretation. To illustrate this point, it should be noted that article 31 is formulated as a 'General rule of interpretation' in the singular form, and not as 'General rules'. This formulation emphasises that the provisions of the article form a single, closely integrated rule; that all elements in article 31 would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give the legally relevant interpretation.
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The rule that the ordinary meaning of a term is not to be determined in the abstract, but in the context of the treaty and in the light of its objects and purposes is, according to the Commission, necessary according to both common sense and good faith. 126 The inclusion of the preamble and annexes in the 'context' is well settled. and any instrument which was made in connection with the conclusion of that treaty, 'should not be treated as mere evidence to which recourse may be had for the purpose of resolving an ambiguity or obscurity, but as part of the context for the purpose of arriving at the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty'. 127 The Commission also introduced three extrinsic elements 'to be taken into account together with the context': agreement as to the interpretation of a provision reached after the conclusion of the treaty; any subsequent practice in the application; and any relevant rules of international law.
The Commission emphasised that the 'context' was not meant to refer only to the text of the treaty but was designed to 'link all the elements of interpretation mentioned in paragraph 2 to the word 'context' in the first paragraph and thereby incorporate them in the provision contained in that paragraph. Equally, the opening phrase of paragraph 3 clarifies that the statement '"There shall be taken into account together with the context" [was] designed to incorporate in paragraph 1 the elements of interpretation set out in paragraph 3'. . 131 Therefore, 'it is only logic which suggests that the elements in paragraph 3 (the subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation, subsequent practice establishing the understanding of the parties regarding the interpretation, and relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties) should follow and not precede the elements in the previous paragraphs'. And due to the 'obligatory character' of these elements, they cannot be considered 'to be norms of interpretation in any way inferior to those, which precede them'. relevant legal tradition. 135 The essentiality of determining the meaning of terms in the virtue of the 'relevant rules of international law', or in other words, the 'language-games' that exist in international law, is best reflected in the following passage from one of the members of the Commission:
The reference to the rules of international law was indispensable, for just as a term could only be understood in a sentence, a sentence only in an article, and an article only in the treaty as a whole, it was impossible to understand the treaty except within the whole international legal order of which it formed a part, which it influenced and by which it was influenced. A treaty was an act of will; the parties had reached agreement, but their agreement was not in vacuo; it was situated in a legal order. In using certain terms, the parties had in mind concepts and meanings established by the legal order. 136 The determination of meaning with reference to the 'language-games' of a particular community requires 'other rules' to be applied to a case which do not derive from the treaty under interpretation. It might be suggested that international tribunals are not entitled to apply the law that goes 'beyond' the four corners of the instrument that establishes the jurisdiction of the tribunal. This belief is caused by confusion in the concepts of 'jurisdiction' and the show clearly that the theoretical approach provided in this paper is not a radical departure from what is already being done. On the contrary, it maps onto current practice and provides a sound foundation to understand why tradition is so important to interpretation in the context of international law.
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper provides a theoretical approach to the nature of interpretation in international law by adhering to the approaches of Gadamer and Wittgenstein. Such philosophical-linguistic intended to operate wholly independently of general international law on the use of force, so as to be capable of justifying, even in the limited context of a claim for breach of the Treaty, the unlawful use of force' (Declaration of Judge Koroma 66 approaches suggest that we do not discover meaning by limiting our vision to bare text, or to the original intentions of authors. Rather, the 'tradition' and 'language-games' within a specific community determine the meanings of terms used in that community. While the applicability of such an insight to law, which is aimed at providing its subject with certainty and stability, might be questioned, reviewing the approaches of different legal theorists reveals that, despite their differences, the dependency of meaning upon social practices and tradition is acknowledged by all of them. Therefore, it is concluded that legal interpretation, by its nature, is no exception and is always mediated by the 'tradition' and 'language-games' of specific communities.
This finding paves the way for a new reading of the system of interpretation provided by articles 31 and 32 of VCLT. It is argued that although the VCLT integrates some of the elements of current interpretive methods, ultimately it adopts its own unique approach based on the dependency of meaning upon 'tradition'. Whereas the nature of international law requires one to take into account the 'conventionalist theory' and to determine meaning based on the acts of the law's subjects, the nature of interpretation requires that the terms be understood with the mediation of the 'language-games' existing in that community. This is recognised in the VCLT system of interpretation by the inclusion of 'the relevant rules of international law' as the primary source for the interpretation of treaties. Therefore, according to the VCLT rules, in every interpretation of the terms of treaties, the text should be understood not only by reference to what the law's subjects have agreed or will agree on, but also, and more importantly, in light of the relevant legal 'tradition'.
